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KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
Volume XXI November, 1932 Number 1
WAIVER OF JURY TRIAL IN CRIMINAL CASES IN
KENTUCKY
Rov BfonsI Am*
There is a wide dissatisfaction both among lawyers and lay-
men with the admnistration of criminal law in the United
States. The fact of the matter is that the situation has become
so serious as to be a "disgrace to civilization" 1 Much has been
written upon the subject, many plans have been suggested look-
ing toward the improvement of conditions. The suggested
Model Code of Crnnmnal Procedure of the American Law Insti-
,tute is one of the most notable recent efforts of those interested
in reform. Although many causes contribute to present condi-
tions, it is believed that the archaic, cumbersome and ineffective
system of criminal procedure that now obtains in a majority of
the states is a principal factor.
The American Law Institute is not urging the adoption of
the Model Code n toto in any state. It is felt that each state
* Professor of Law, College of Law, University of Kentucky. A. B.,
Transylvania College, 1920; LL. B., "with distinction", College of Law,
University of Kentucky, 1923; J. D., University of Chicago Law School,
1928. Author of various articles in legal periodicals.
I"Some years ago, the late William Howard Taft declared that
the administration of the criminal law in the United States was a
'disgrace to civilization'. We recall the statement first, we believe, when
Mr. Taft was Secretary of War in the cabinet of President Roosevelt,
prior to wiuch time he had been assistant prosecuting attorney of
Hamilton County, Ohio, judge of the Superior Court of Cincinnati,
solicitor general of the United States, judge of the United States Cir-
cuit Court, and dean of the Law Department of the University of Cin-
cinnati. Mr. Taft repeated this criticism when President of the United
States, and reiterated it several times after he became Chief Justice
of the United States Supreme Court." 65 U. S. L. Rev. 528 (1931).
"The administration of criminal justice in the United States is a
failure. This is an alarming fact. It is not a new condition. For years
the failure has been patent to any careful observer, but it has taken
the recent appalling increase in crime to make us realize it." William
Draper Lewis, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social
Science, Vol. CXXV, No. 214, p. 85.
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should decide for itself just what sections of the Code it desires
to adopt. For that reason it is necessary that the Code be
critically examined by the lawyers of the various states in order
that they may make such recommendations for local adoption as
seem desirable. With that in view the Institute has asked the
bar association of each state to appoint a committee to consider
the Model Code. Such a committee has been appointed in Ken-
tucky It made a preliminary report at the 1932 meeting of
the Kentucky State Bar Association and asked to have an oppor-
tunity to continue its study with the expectation that it would
make a final report at the 1933 meeting of the Association when
it would make specific recommendations for the adoption of
certain specific sections of the Code in Kentucky It is expected
that the members of the Association will discuss these recom-
mendations at that time and that it will lend its influence
towards the adoption of such sections of the Code as it approves
by the 1934 General Assembly
One of the sections of the Model Code which the committee
has tentatively selected for local adoption is section 266 provid-
ing for waiver of jury trial in criminal cases. It is expected
that those who favor or oppose the adoption of this section in
Kentucky in its present or in a modified form will write to the
Chairman of the Committee. 2 It is with the expectation of
drawing attention to this section that this paper has been pre-
pared. It is hoped that those who care to discuss the adoption
of this or other sections of the Model Code of the American Law
Institute will use the pages of this journal for that purpose. 3
2 Mr. Wallace Muir, Lexington, IKy., is Chairman of the Committee.
3 The sections tentatively selected for adoption in Kentucky are as
follows:
Section 312. Trial ,where joint defendants. When two or
more defendants are jointly charged with any offense, whether
felony or misdemeanor, they shall be tried jointly, unless the court
in its discretion on the motion of the prosicuting attorney or any
defendant orders separate trials. In ordering separate trials, the
court may order that one or more defendants be each separately
tried and the others jointly tried, or may order that several de-
fendants be jointly tried in one trial and the others jointly tried
in another trial or trials, or may order that each defendant be
separately tried.
Section 266. 'When trial by jury may be waived. In all cases
except where a sentence of death may be imposed trial by a jury
may be waived by the defendant. Such waiver shall be made in
open court and entered of record.
Section 85. Contracts to indemnify sureties. Every surety
for the release of any person on bail, shall file with the under-
WAIVER OF JuRY TRIAL IN CRIMNAL CASES
There can be no doubt that trial by jury is on trial m this
country While there are those who still continue to regard it
with reverent awe as the bulwark of liberty, the safeguard of
life and property,4 there are others who consider that it has out-
lived its usefulness, has become a sort of societal antique, and
that it is partly responsible for the present breakdown m the
administration of crnnmal justice in the United States.5 A
taking an affidavit stating whether or not he or any one for his
use has been promised or has received any security or considera-
tion for his undertaking, and if so, the nature and amount thereof,
and the name of the person by whom such promise was made
or from whom such security or consideration was received. Any
wilful misstatement in such affidavit or any intentional omission
to set forth in the affidavit all the security or consideration
promised or given shall render the person making it subject to the
same penalty as one who commits perjury An action to enforce
any indemnity agreement shall not lie in favor of the surety
against such indemnitor, except with respect to agreements set
forth in such affidavit. In an action by the indemnitor against the
surety to recover any collateral or security given by the indemnitor,
such surety shall have the right to retain only such security or
collateral as is mentioned in the affidavit required above.
Section 102. Undertaking a lien. The undertaking shall be
a lien on any real property described in the affidavit required by
Section 79 from the time of the recording of such undertaking
and affidavit in the county in which the property is situated. Upon
the filing of an order with the ............ of the county where
the property is situated cancelling the undertaking the lien shall
be discharged.
Section 112. Taking snsuficient bail, accepting snsufficient or
unqualified sureties. Any official who takes bail which he knows to
be insufficient, or accepts a surety in an undertaking knowing such
surety not to possess the qualification or sufficiency required by
law is guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be imprisoned not ex-
ceeding ......................... or fined not exceeding ......................... or both
at the discretion of the court.
"Trial by jury has long been cherished as one of the greatest
securities of human rights, as is shown whenever excessive tyranny
has undertaken to trample the people under its feet. Venerable in-
stitution and friend of the common people, you have had a long and
useful life! For more than a thousand years you have stood as a knight
of honor, guarding the people's rights and redressing their wrongs.
You have limited the power of rulers and modified the austerities of
legislation! You have tempered 'justice with mercy and technicality
with common sense. You have been the master of despots and the
counselor of Legislatures. You have been the guardian and best friend
of liberty through these thousands of years. Where you have exited,
there liberty has survived the onslaught of its foes. Where vou have
not lived, there tyranny has ruled the people with an iron hand and
trampled their rights in the dust of degradation. You have been the
most valient and successful defendant of the citadels of freedom."
Dissenting opinion of Etheridge, J., in Talbot d- Higgzns Lumber Co. v.
McLeod Lumber Co., 147 Miss. 186, 113 So. 433,440 (1927).
" "What is the case in behalf of jury trial? There is none, save
such as lies in the reverence we may have for a venerable institution.
There are some few cases, as, for instance, foolish political prosecu-
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third group, represented by such men as Dean Wigmore, assumes
a nddle ground, namely, that jury trial as at present admm-
istered is defective, 6 but that properly reformed it would be on
the whole superior to judge trial.7 Tins is probably the proper
view of the matter.
tions, and witch-burners persecutions, in which the jury may save the
law's face. But after all, it is usually the backbone of some fearless
judge that does the saving in such cases, if there is any saving at all.
We have enshrined jury trial along with other antiquated ideas about
the administration of justice in our fundamental law, and worse still,
in the hearts of our people. They lie there as dead as Hector, and
everybody knows they are dead, but who dares touch them? Why
make one's self foolish? Those 'true friends of the people' who traffic
in trial by jury would want nothing better. 'Oh, yes, just as we
thought, those corporation lawyers and highbrows, those foes of
justice, are finally showing themselves in their true garb! They pro-
pose to rob the poor men of his one chance of justice, his security
against tyranny, the people's jury' They would destroy this jewel of
Magna Charta. I Thus they capitalize the tendency in all people to
worship the phrases as well as the practices and memories of their
ancestors As a formula for administering justice trial by jury
is merely a societal antique. But it typifies something back in the
growth of society which has been gripped by man's emotions and they
will not let it go. Its processes radiate a flavor of popular justice and
a flourish of democracy. Those are still stout words. But the fact
is that in the organism of society, as in the organisms of all life, there
are structural parts which no longer serve useful functions. They re-
appear nevertheless in succeeding generations. They are sometimes
removed from the physical organism by heroic surgery. To this the
social organism seldom submits. Moreover, the intelligence that would
do so in this instance would not stop with the jury's removal; it
would demand more cutting." Leon Green, Dean, Northwestern Law
School, in American Mercury, November, 1928.
6 Dean Wigmore in his article, cited infra, note 7, states that noth-
Ing has ever been alleged against jury trial that is not mentioned in
one or another of these articles: "Robert H. Elder, 'Trial by Jury*
Is It Passing?' (Harper's Mo. Mag., April, 1928; Amer. Law Sch. Rev.,
May, 1928), Russell Duane and F Lyman Windolph, 'Should the Civil
Jury be Abolished?' a debate (Forum, Oct., 1928; Nov., 1928; Journal
of the American Judicature Society, Feb., 1929), Edgar A. Poe and
Martin W Littleton, 'Should the Criminal Jury be Abolished?' a de-
bate (Forum, Nov., 1928), Leon Green, 'Why Trial by Jury9 ' (Amer.
Mercury, Nov., 1928), Victor House, 'Are American Juries at Fault?'
(Atl. Mo., Aug., 1928), Harold H. Crobin, 'The Jury On Trial' (Amer.
Bar Assn. Jour., Oct., 1928)."
T "The writer happens to be one who believes that jury trial, prop-
erly reformed, is on the whole superior to judge trial. Of
course, jury trial, as is, works 'badly. Of course, jury trial, as now
managed, is insufficient. Of course, it exudes an aroma of repellance
to the citizen, of shame to the legal profesgion, and of doubt to the
chambered student of political science. .. But is that a good
and sufficient reason for abolishing trial by jury9 No more than our
mishandling of a once perfectly good watch is a reason for discarding
the watch-or watches in general-if it or they can be mended. The
true thing to be done about trial by jury is to MEND IT." John H.
Wigmore, "A Program for the Trial of Jury Trial", The Journal of
the American Judicature Society, April, 1929, Vol. XII, No. 6, pp.
166-172.
WAmR or JuRY TRiAL n CRimnAL CASES
But it is not the purpose of this paper, as previously stated,
to discuss the merits and demerits of trial by jury as contrasted
with trial by a judge or judges in criminal cases. That is an
altogether different question from the one to be discussed at this
time. Whether or not an accused should be entitled to a trial by
jury as a matter of rsght is not now in question. The specific
question discussed herein is whether the accused is entitled to
wave tbis right and be tried by the court or by a jury of less
than twelve, if, of ins own volition, he desires to do so. Section
266 of the Model Codes of the American Law Institute gives
bin tins privilege. It will be our purpose to discuss the con-
stitutional problems involved in waiver of jury trial and to
make specific recommendations for Kentucky as to the adoption
in whole or in part of tins section of the Model Code.
A. CO STUTInwALIT ov WAIVR-IN GimiER .
The constant reference in the decisions to constitutional and
statutory provisions, suggests a classification of the cases on
tins basis. A few state constitutions specifically grant an oppor-
tunity to waive trial by jury 9 The majority of them, however,
8 "Section 266. When Trial by Jury May be Waived. In all cases
except where a sentence of death may be imposed trial by a jury may
be waived by the defendant. Such a waiver shall be made in open
court and entered of record."
'A. The constitutions of the following states expressly provide
for waiver of jury trial.
I. In all cases:
Arkansas-Const., 1874, Art. II, Sec. 7, "in all cases in the
manner prescribed by law" Sec. 3086 of the Dig. of Stat., 1921,
provides that the parties may by consent waive a jury in all cases
of misdemeanors.
California-Const., 1879, Art. I, Sec. 7, Amendment of Nov. 6,
1928. Previous to this it was allowed "in all criminal cases not
amounting to the felony by the consent of both parties, expressed
in open court" The present statute--Pen. Code, 1925, See. 1042-
allows waiver only in misdemeanor cases.
Maryland--Const., 1867, Art. IV, Sec. 8. "The parties to any
cause may submit the same to the court for determination without
the aid of a jury." In the Code, 1924, Art. 75, Sec. 109, it is pro-
vided: "The parties to any cause may submit the same to the
court for determination without the aid of a jury."
Minnesota--Const., 1857, Art. I, Sec. 4, "in all cases in the
manner prescribed by law" No statute was found authorizing
waiver of jury trial. Sec. 10705 provides: "Every issue of fact
shall be tried by a jury of the county in which the indictment
was found, unless the action shall have been removed."
North Carolina-Const., 1876, Art. IV, Sec. 13: "In all issues
of fact joined in any court, the parties may waive the right to
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are silent on the question, so that whether there is a constitu-
tional power to permit a waiver is a problem of construction m
most states. Some of the leading decisions will be examned m
order to determine how this problem has been met. For con-
vemence, these eases will be considered as follows
(1) Cases which concede the constitutionality of waiver and reasons
therefor.
(2) Cases which deny -the constitutionality of waiver and reasons
therefor.
(1) Cases whsch concede the constitutionality of waiver
and reasons therefor
In State v WordenO the defendant was indicted, tried, and
convicted of the crime of rape upon a female ten years of age.
have the same determined by a jury, in which case the finding of
the judge upon the facts shall have the force and effect of a
verdict by a jury." In Art. I, See. 13, the legislature is expressly
given the power to "provide other means (than trial by jury) of
trial for petit misdemeanors, with the right of appeal"
Oklahomh-Const., 1907, Art. VII, Sec. 20, like North Carolina,
Art. IV, Sec. 13.
Wisconsin-Const., 1848, Art. I, Sec. 5, "in all cases, in the
manner prescribed by law" In the Stat., 1929, Sec. 357.01 (passed
in 1925) provision is made for waiver of jury in all cases. Previ-
ous to this waiver of jury trial was allowed only in misdemeanor
cases. Stat., 1911, Sec. 4687.
II. In cases below the grade of felony-
Idaho-Const., 1890, Art. I, Sec. 7, "by the consent of both
parties, expressed in open court" Sec. 8904 provides: "Issues of
fact must be tried by jury, unless a trial by jury be waived, in
criminal cases not amounting to felony, by the consent of both
parties expressed in open court and entered in the minutes."
Montana-Const., 1876, Art. III, Sec. 23, "upon default of ap-
pearance or by consent of the parties expressed in such manner
as the law may prescribe" Sec. 11929 is like Idaho, Sec. 8904,
supra.
Vermont-Sess. Laws, 1921, p. 339, provides for a constitutional
amendment allowing waiver by accused with consent of the pros-
ecuting attorney Passed by the voters in 1923. In Sec. 30 of the
Const., 1793 and 1913, it is provided: "Trials of issues, prcper for
the cognizance of a jury, in the Supreme and County Courts,
shall be by jury, except where parties otherwise agree." This has
apparently never been considered as permitting waiver of jury
trial in criminal cases.
Virginia--Const., 1902, Art. I, Sec. 8. Sec. 4927 of the Code of
1930 allows waiver in misdemeanor cases with the consent of the
attorney for the commonwealth.
The information in this note is taken verbatim from the com-
mentary to Sec. 266, American Law Institute, Code Crim. Proc., Official
Draft, June 15, 1930, with Commentaries, pp. 807-808. See also Oppen-
heim, Waiver of Trial by Jury in Criminal Cases, 25 Mich. L. Rev. 695,
699-700 (1927).
20 46 Conn. 349 (1878).
WAivER oF Jury Tn m CRThxIAL CASEs
The trial, at the prisoner's request, was by the court instead of
the jury The prisoner moved in arrest of judgment, partly bn
the ground that the statutei" authorizing hin to elect to be tried
by the court was uiconstitutional and void. The motion was
overruled and the defendant appealed.
The constitution provided, "The right of trial by jury shall
remain inviolate." It was the contention of the defendant that
the word "right" therein was more political than personal, that
the interest of the state in its maintenance was so closely inter-
woven with the purely personal interest of the individual that
its surrender was placed beyond the power of the individual.
The court demed the contention and sustained the statute,
holding that the natural and obvious meaning of the constitu-
tional provision was to secure the right of jury trial to individ-
uals and that the public was not prejudiced. Said the court,
"The natural and obvious meamng is to secure to suitors and
persons accused of crime, as individuals, the right and privilege
of having their causes heard and determined by a jury, and it is
difficult to see how the principles of liberty and self-government,
or the interests of the body politic, can in any way be put in
jeopardy by a waiver of that right.' '12
In Com. v Rowe,i 3 the defendants were indicted in eleven
counts for larcemes, which because of the different values
involved, constituted both felomes and misdemeanors. In
another indictment they were charged with a misdemeanor.
They pleaded not guilty to both indictments and before trial
signed and filed a waiver of trial by jury The signature of
each defendant was witnessed by his counsel. After evidence
for the prosecution was in they attempted to withdraw the
waivers. Such motions were demed and trial proceeded. It
was held the motions were properly demed.
In a well-reasoned opinon the court held that the right to
trial by jury guaranteed by the Massachusetts constitution is a
privilege which the person may waive for reasons satisfactory
11 The statute of 1874, which was in force when this case was tried,
provided: "In all criminal causes, prosecutions and proceedings, the
party accused may, if he shall so elect, when called upon to plead, be
tried by the court, instead of by the jury; and in such cases the court
shall have full power to hear and try such cause, and render judgment
and sentence thereon."
2246 Conn. 349, 364 (1878)
"257 Mass. 172, 153 N. E. 537 (1926).
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to himself. "Again and again", said the court, "as the cases
referred to illustrate, this court has treated the right as a privi-
lege sacredly regarded by the commonwealth and preserved to
the individual against assault by the state, but a privilege winch
he could waive, and in certain circumstances, would be treated
as waiving."
In Patton v. U S.,14 the leading case on waiver of jury trial,
the defendants were charged with conspiring to bribe a federal
prohibition officer, a felony During the progress of the trial,
-one of the jurors, because of severe illness, became unable to
serve further. Thereupon it was stipulated in open court, the
defendants personally assenting thereto, that the trial should
proceed with the remaining eleven jurors. The court consented
to such stipulation and the trial proceeded resulting in a verdict
of guilty The question of the power of the defendants to waive
their constitutional right to a trial by a jury of twelve persons
was certified to the Supreme Court of the United States.
The Supreme Court first considered what is embraced by
the constitutional phrase "trial by jury" The court concluded
that it means a trial by jury as understood at common law and
includes all essential elements as they were recognized in tins
country and England when the constitution was adopted.
"Those elements were. (1) That the jury should consist of
twelve men, neither more nor less, (2) That the trial should be
in the presence and under the superintendence of a judge having
power to instruct them as to the law and advise them in respect
of the facts, and (3) That the verdict should be unanimous."
These elements the court considered to be embedded in the con-
stitutional guaranty of trial by jury and beyond the authority
of the legislative department to destroy or abridge. Conse-
quently, it followed, said the court, that any distinction between
the effect of a complete waiver of jury and consent to be tried by
a less number than twelve must be rejected, since both forms of
waiver amount, in substance, to the same thing.
With this position we are in accord. It has been suggested
that by reducing the number of the jury to eleven or ten the
infraction of the constitution ss slight. Although that is true, it is
apt to lead to an erroneous conclusion. The constitutional ques-
1, 281 U. S. 276, 60 Sup. Ct. 253 (1930).
WAIvER or JuRy TmAt w Cnam nvA CASEs
tion cannot be evaded by comparing the difference between
serious infractions of the constitution with mvnor infractions.
"To uphold the voluntary reduction of a jury from twelve to
-eleven upon the ground that the reduction-though it destroys
the jury of the constitution-is only a slight reduction, is not to
interpret that instrument, but to disregard it."15 It is not the
province of a court to measure the extent to winch the consti-
tution has been contravened and ignore the violation because it
is not relatively as bad as it mght have been.
It is true that various state courts have held that it is com-
petent for a defendant to waive the continued presence of a
single juror, while at the same time denying the validity of a
waiver of a considerable number of jurors, or of a jury alto-
gether. 16 But there appears to be no substantial ground for the
distinction and several state courts have 3oined with the Supreme
Court in tins conclusion. 17
- 281 U. S. 276, 292 (1930).
State v. Kaufman, 51 Ia. 578, 2 N. W. 275 (1879), with which
compare State v. Williams, 195 Ia. 374, 191 N. W 790 (1923), Cor. ex
rel. Ross v. Egan, 281 Pa. 341, 140 Atl. 488 (1924), with which compare
or. v. Hall, 291 Pa. 341, 140 Atl. 626 (1928). "In certain of the cases
cited by the court below, the defendant had expressly allowed the trial
to proceed with a jury of less than 12, and the reviewing tribunal
discussed the matter as though there had been a waiver of the entire
jury, suggesting that, logically, such wholesale relinquishment on the
part of the defendant could as well be sustained in law as the waiver
of the services of a single juror. It should, however, be evident to
everyone that trial by a judge without any jurors is quite a different
thing from trial by judge and jurors, though the latter be less than the
standard number." (Italics are ours.) Com. v. Hall, supra at 627. This
argument is rather persuasive. Did the framers of the constitution with
the historical incidents of oppression at the hands of the state and its
judges in mind consciously intend to insist upon a fact finding tribunal
which should come directly from the people? If the purpose of the
enactment was merely to insure that a "slice of the community" found
the facts in a criminal case rather than a judge, it is perfectly evident
that a trial by a judge is altogether different from a trial by judge and
jury, though the jury be less than the standard number of twelve. The
framers of the constitution might well, under the above argument,
have been willing to reduce the number of jurors to less than twelve
although they were not at all willing to leave fact finding to a judge.
A jury of less than twelve is still a "jury" In a class study of this
problem approximately half of the class agreed with the conclusion in
Com. v. Hall, rather than the conclusion in the Patton case.
2
1 State v. Baer, 103 Ohio St. 585, 134 N. E. 786 (1921), Jennings
v. State, 134 Wis. 307, 114 N. W. 492 (1908). "It seems necessarily to
follow that if a person on trial in a criminal case has no power to waive
a jury he has no right to be tried by a less number than a common
law jury of twelve, and when he puts himself on the county it requires
a jury of twelve to comply with the demands of the Constitution."
Jennzngs v. State, supra, in this note.
KENTUCKY LAw JOURNAL
Having come to the conclusion that the problem before the
court constituted one of waiver of jury trial, the court was
forced to face fairly the question, "Can trial by jury be
waived 
9 "
The answer to this inquiry, the court considered, depended
upon whether trial by jury is a part of the frame of government
or only a guaranty to the accused of the right to such a trial.
If the former, the possibility of waiver by the accused would be
removed, since the public would have an interest in its mainte-
nance prohibiting an opportunity to the accused to waive the
right.
In an able discussion the court concluded that there was no
evidence either in English and colonial jurisprudence antedating
the constitution or in contemporaneous literature and debates
on the constitution indicating that the right of trial by jury was
intended other than prsmarily for the protection of the accused.
A fortwrt said the court he can waive the privilege. The argu-
ment of the court is most persuasive.
"The record of English and colonial jurisprudence antedating the
constitution will be searched in vain for evidence that trial by jury in
criminal cases was regarded as a part of the structure of government,
as distinguished from a right or privilege of the accused. On the con-
trary, it uniformly was regarded as a valuable privilege bestowed upon
the person accused of crime for the purpose of safeguarding him against
the oppressive power of the King and the arbitrary or partial judg-
ment of the court. Thus Blackstone, who held trial by jury both in
civil and criminal cases in such esteem that he called it 'the glory
of the English law', nevertheless looked upon it as a 'privilege', albeit
'the most transcendent privilege which any subject can enjoy' Book
III, p. 379. And Judge Story, writing, at a time when the adoption of
the constitution was still in the memory of men then living, speaking
of trial by jury in criminl cases, said.
'When our more immediate ancestors removed to America, they
brought this great prvizege with them, as their birthright and
inheritance, as a part of that admira1l common law which had
fenced round and imposed barriers on every side against the ap-
proaches of arbitrary power. It is now incorporated into all our
state constitutions as a fundamental right, and the Constitution
of the United States would have been justly obnoxious to the most
conclusive objection if it had not recognized and confirmed it in
the most solemn terms.' 2 Story on the Constitution, Sec. 1779.
In the light of the foregoing it is reasonable to conclude that the
framers of the constitution simply were intent upon preserving the
right of trial by jury primarily for the protection of the accused. If
not, and their intention went beyond this and included the purpose
of establishing the jury for the trial of crimes as an integral and in-
separable part of the court, instead of one of its instrumentalities, it
is strange that nothing to that effect appears in contemporaneous litera-
ture or in any ot the debates or innumerable discussions of the time.
WAIVEo F JURY TRIAL IN CRmInAL CASFS
This is all the more remarkable when we recall the minute scrutiny
to which every provision of the proposed constitution was subjected.
The reasonable inference is that ,the concern of the framers of the
constitution was to make clear that the right of trial by jury should
remain inviolable, to which end no language was deemed too inpera-
tive."
Should there be a distinction between felonies and nsde-
meanors as to the power to waive trial by jury in the absence of
statutory authority' Certain decisions so declare.
1 8  But we
are unable to find in the absence of a statute indicating a positive
public policy to the contrary any good reason for differentiating
in the matter of waiver between the two classes of crimes. The
general principles underlying the power to waive trial by jury
is the same in both felonies and misdemeanors.
The modern trend of opinion substantiates this conclusion.
1 9
Illinois will illustrate. That state although permitting waiver
of jury in misdemeanor cases refused to do so in the case of
felonies. But in a recent decision, People v. Fishe'r,20 it was held
that there may be a waiver of jury trial in all cases and a trial
by the court. This case expressly overrules Harrss v People,21
an earlier case, which held that in felony cases a waiver could
not confer jurisdiction upon the court to try the case. Ap-
parently, the United States Supreme Court once accepted the
same differentiation but it was discarded in Patton v United
States.
22 The court, after reviewing the conflicting decisions,
was unable to find any good reason for differentiating in the
matter of waiver between the two classes of crimes. The court
accepted as sound the following conclusion.
"The grounds upon which the decisions rest are, upon principle,
applicable alike in cases of felonies and misdemeanors, although the
28 These may be found collected in a note, 48 A. L. R. 768 et seq.
"In some states a distinction is made between trials for felonies and
trials for misdemeanors only. Tyra v. Cor., 2 Metc. (Ky.) 1. State v.
.Borowsky, 11 Nev. 119; Darst v. People, 51 Ill. 286, 2 Am. Rep. 301."
State v. Ross, 47 S. D. 188, 197 N. W 234 (1924).
1 "The constitutional provision which appellant claims is violated
here applies equally to felonies and misdemeanors, and we think this
case is ruled by the decision of this court in State v. Ross, supra. It
is true that case involved a misdemeanor only, but it involved the
same constitutional provision now before us. We are unable to see
how it is possible to draw a distinction in this respect between felonies
and misdemeanors, because the constitution does not recognize such
distinction." State v. Tiedman, 49 S. D. 356, 207 N. W 153 (1926).
Accord, State v. Browman, 191 Ia. 608, 182 N. W. 823 (1921).
340 Ill. 250, 172 N. E. 722 (1930).
-128 Ill. 585, 21 N. E. 563 (1889).
=281 U. S. 276 (1929).
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consequences to the accused may be more evident as well as more
serious in the former than in the latter cases."
These cases reach the proper logical result. 23 The fact of
the matter is that the constitution guarantees the right of trial
by jury to the accused in the case of botb felonies and misde-
meanors. Bothb are included in the usual constitutional pro-
vision providing that "trial by jury shall remain inviolate."
It follows that the power of the accused to waive is no more and
no less available in the one case than it is in the other, although
the consequences to him may be more evident as well as more
serious in the former than in the latter cases.
Assuming, therefore, that no distinction should be made
between felonies and misdemeanors in the power to waive the
constitutional guaranty of trial by jury, may a state differentiate
between them by statute ? Let us suppose that a state has the
usual constitutionaZ provision, "Trial by jury shall remain
mviolate" This, we have decided, should apply equally to
felonies and misdemeanors. But, in addition, let us suppose
that the state has a statutory provision, "Trial by jury may be
waived, except in felony cases" Under such a statute there
would be no power in the accused to waive trial by jury in a
felony case. Here it is not the constitutional provision which
denies the power but the statutory one. The state has passed
a statute which indicates a positive public policy to distinguish
between felonies and misdemeanors as to trial by jury and the
statute must be followed.
An instance of a state differentiating between felonies and
misdemeanors by statute on the ground of public policy is
furnished by Kansas in the case of State v. Wells.24  In that
case a statute provided.
0 Com. v. Egan, 281 Pa. 251, 126 Atl. 488 (1924). "It is difficult to
understand how there can be any distinction (as to waiver of
jury trial) between a prosecution for a felony, and a prosecution for
such a misdemeanor as at common law entitled the defendant to a
jury trial. It would seem in reason that if a jury cannot be waived
in one it cannot be waived in the other and that if it can be waived in
one it can b0 waived in the other. The grade of the crime should be
immaterial, provided it is such a crime as entitled the defendant to a
jury trial at common law, for, as we have seen, the constitutions guar-
antee the same right as existed at common law. If, therefore, a jury
trial cannot be waived in one case in which it was necessary at com-
mon law, it cannot, in reason, be waived in another." Clark's Crim.
Proc., 2nd ed., pp. 509-510.
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"The defendant and prosecuting attorney, with the assent of the
court, may submit the trial to the court, except in cases of felonies."
Here is a conscious attempt by the legislature to distinguish
between felonies and misdemeanors. Burch, J., i Ins concur-
ring opinion said.
"In misdemeanor cases the reaction of the state i much less vio-
lent, and the consequences of a conviction are much less serious. The
interest of society is relaxed, and the will of the accused may be
allowed to prevail. When 'high motives of public interest no longer
require that a waiver be absolutely inhibited, -the Legislature may
define the policy of the state respecting the manner of trials."
Certainly, the legislature could not permit a waiver, even in
the case of inusdemeanors, in the face of the constitutional pro-
vision guaranteeing the right of trial by jury if there were no
power in the accused to waive such right. But assuming that it
is the better rule that the accused has the power to waive the
right given under the constitutional provision, the legislature
may limit the power as it sees fit as an exercise of its power to
define the public policy of the state.
Although no distinction should be made between felonies
and misdemeanors in the power to waive trial by jury, a valid
distinction may be made between these two classes of crimes and
petty offenses. Such a distinction is sustained upon the ground
that the accused was.not entitled, as of right, to a jury trial in
the case of petty offenses at common law, consequently, when
the provision relating to trial by jury was inserted in the con-
stitution it was not intended that it should apply to them. Tins
distinction, recognized in the cases, is thus stated by Clark.
"At common law a person accused of petit offenses, such as
vagrancy, disorderly conduct, violation of a municipal ordinance, and
trivial breaches of the peace, of which justices of the peace and police
magistrates had jurisdiction, had no right to demand a trial by jury,
and by the weight of authority he has no such right under the con-
stitutional guaranty, for, as we have seen, it was only intended to
guaranty the same right as had always existed at common law.' ' z
Having decided that so far as the question of constitution-
ality is concerned there should be no distinction between felonies
and misdemeanors, we now return to our study of cases which
concede the constitutionality of waiver of jury trial. Several
cases involving felonies have been considered in detail. A case
2'69 Kan. 792, 77 Pac. 547 (1904).
m Clark's Criminal Procedure, 2nd ed., 508, and cases there cited.
See also 16 Iowa L. Rev. 20, 34, and cases cited.
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involving a misdemeanor will now be studied. In the commonly
cited case of State v Woodling,26 the defendant was arraigned
before a mumcipal court for assault and battery, a misdemeanor.
He pleaded not guilty and expressly waived a jury, whereupon
the court tried the case and found hin guilty On appeal the
defendant raised the question whether the court had jurisdiction
to render judgment without the verdict of a jury The case
contains as valuable an analysis of the problem as may be found
in the book. Mitchell, J., said.
"As to what constitutional rights may be waived by defendants in
criminal cases, and particularly whether they can waive the right of
trial by jury, is a subject upon which much has been written, and upon
which there is much difference of opinion. Without going into any
general discussion of the subject, we may say thaA it seems to us that
perhaps the true criterion is whether the right is a privilege intended
merely for the benefit of the defendant, or whether it is one which
also affects the public, or goes to the jurisdiction of the court. If it
belongs to the first class, we see no good reason why the accused may
not waive it; but if it belongs to the latter, it would seem that no con-
sent on his part could amount to a valid waiver; and the different
views entertained as to the nature and object of constitutional pro-
visions relating to the right of trial by jury in criminal cases will
probably account for the conflict -of decisions as to wether it can be
waived. Those who construe the right as a matter in which the public
has no interest, and wnch is not jurisdictional, but designed solely for
the protection of the defendant, naturally hold that it may be waived;
while those who take the view that it affects the public as well as the
defendant, or that it relates to the constitution of the court, of which
it is intended to make the jury an essential part, as naturally hold that
it ,cannot be waived."
The court considered trial by jury a privilege accorded to
the defendant which he could waive. Most of what the court
said is probably puie dictum, since the question of whatever
arose in the municipal court of Minneapolis, winch had jurisdic-
tion only of offenses cognizable before a justice of the peace, and
consequently petty offenses, where trial by jury was not guaran-
teed under the constitutional provision providing for trial by
jury, but the opinion is valuable for its persuasive reasoning.
To summarize, it would appear that those jurisdictions
which concede the constitutionality of waiver of trial by jury do
so largely on the theory that it is a privilege intended solely for
the benefit of the accused and one which he may waive at Ins
election. It should be pointed out that such a result permits a
waiver without the necessity of constitutional amendment,-
2153 Minn. 142, 54 N. W. 1068 (1893).
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even without the necessity of a statute, it -would seem, although
such an affirmative indication of the public policy of the state is
advisable.2 7
One further problem arising in jurisdictions permitting a
waiver of jury trial deserves comment. If jury trial is a privi-
lege winch the accused may forego, it is not consistent to require
the consent of the state or of the court, as a condition precedent
to the exercise of the right. Although tis was deemed neces-
sary in the Patton case,2 8 it is at variance with the underlying
conception of common law waiver. It is wise, perhaps, that the
exercise of the right to waive be made by the defendant in open
court but the consent of the court or of the state should not be
necessary 29
Some decisions in jurisdictions winch deny the constitution-
ality of waiver of trial by jury will now be examined and an
attempt made to determine the reasons of these courts for such
demal.
(2) Cases which deny the constitutionality of waiver, and
reasons therefor
Cancems v. People"0 is the leading case holding that the
right of trial by jury cannot be waived by the accused. In that
case Cancemi was indicted for the crime of murder. After the
jury had been inpaneled and sworn, and the trial of the
prisoner commenced, a stipulation made by the prisoner, ins
counsel, and the counsel on behalf of the people was presented
to the court, and a juror was withdrawn by the express request
and consent of the prisoner in pursuance of such stipulation.
The remaining eleven jurors rendered a verdict of guilty The
New York Court of Appeals reversed the judgment upon the
ground that the defendant did not have the right by Ins own act,
though voluntary, to waive a jury of twelve because "the state,
the public, has an interest in the preservation of the liberties and
the lives of the citizens, and will not allow them to be taken away
'without due process of law' "
0 Such a result, the proper one, it is submitted, has been reached
In some jurisdictions. See A. L. I. Code of Crim. Proc., commentaries,
page 810.
281 U. S. 276, 312 (1930).
Accord, Grant, Wasver of Jury Trial in Pelony Cases, 20 Cal. L.
Rev., 132, 161.
2018 N.Y. 128 (1858).
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Civil suits, the court pointed out, relate to and affect only
individual rights and duties. Any departure from legal rules
in the conduct of such suits with the consent of the defendants
is therefore largely a voluntary relinquishment of what belongs
to them. Hence, the law recognizes the propriety of waiver in
such cases to a great extent. Criminal prosecutions, on the
other hand, involve public wrongs, a breach and violation of
public rights and duties, which affect the whole community in its
social and aggregate capacity It follows, the court argued,
that the state has such an interest in the outcome of a crininal
trial that it will not permit the defendant. to have the opportu-
nity to waive in his discretion the right to trial by jury
The holding of the court in the Cancems case that public
policy forbids a person accused of a crime to waive trial by jury
since the public as well as the defendant has an interest in the
outcome of the trial has influenced subsequent decisions to a
marked degree. Another reason, in addition to this one, was
suggested in the case of State v Mansfield,3 1 decided nine years
later.
-- In that case the defendant was accused 6f having committed
a felony When the jury was called twelve men were selected
and impaneled to try the case. On the next morning one of
the jurors failed-to answer and it was stated that he was sick.
It was then agreed, the prisoner consenting thereto, that the
trial should proceed with the remanmng jurors, and accordingly
eleven jurors heard the cause and rendered a verdict of guilty.
It was held that upon an indictment for a felony the defend-
ant cannot waive his constitutional right to be tried by a jury of
twelve men. In the first place the court considered, as did the
court in the Cancemz case, which was cited, that no one has the
right by his own voluntary act to surrender his life or part with
his liberty, since the public generally is interested in their pres-
ervation. Another good and sufficient reason for the holding,
said the court, was that a jury of twelve men is a positive
requirement of the law, the accused has no power to consent to
the creation of a new tribunal unknown to the law to try his
offense. 32 This argument is based upon the deduction that the
-i41 Mo. 470 (1867).
12 "Another good and sufficient reason, it occurs to us, is, that the
prisoner's consent cannot change the law. His right to be tried by a
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common law jury is an essential part of the tribunal without
which the court has no jurisdiction of the subject matter. In
other words, that the court is only organized and empowered to
do business m the presence of a jury of twelve men. In the
absence of such a jury it does not have jurisdiction to try the
cause.
In some states the position is taken that because of the
mandatory nature of the language used m the constitutional
provision providing for trial by jury waiver is impossible. In
State v. Cottri7133 the defendant was indicted for selling spiritu-
ous liquors without a license, a nusdemeanor. Section 14 of the
state bill of rights provided. "Trial of crimes and nisde-
meanors, unless herein otherwise provided, shall be by a jury of
twelve men" Defendant, under a statute providing for a
waiver in misdemeanor cases, elected to be tried by the court.
The statute was held to be unconstitutional on appeal from a
conviction. The court pointed out that the constitutional pro-
vision used language more mandatory in nature than is to be
found in any state constitution, with the exception of North
Carolina.3 4 This language the court considered to be so impera-
jury of twelve men is not a mere privilege; it is a positive requirement
of the law. He can unquestionably, waive many of his legal rights or
privileges. He may agree to certain facts and dispense with formal
proofs; he may consent to the introduction of evidence not strictly
legal, or forbear to interpose challenges to the jurors; but he has no
power to consent to the creation of a new tribunal unknown to the law
to try his offense. The law in its wisdom has declared what shall be
a legal jury in the trial of criminal cases; that it shall be composed
of twelve; and a defendant when he is upon trial cannot be permitted
to change the law, and substitute another and a different tribunal to
pass upon his guilt or innocence." State v. Mansfield, 41 Mo. 470, 478
(1867).
"A jury of twelve men being the only legally constituted tribunal
for the trial of an indictment foil a felony, it necessarily follows that
the court or judge is not such tribunal, and that in the absence of a
jury, he has by law no jurisdiction. There is no law which authorizes
him to sit as a substitute for a jury and perfor& their functions in
such cases, and if he attempts to do so, his act must be regarded as
nugatory. Especially must this be true where the jury are not only
the judges of the facts as at common law, but are also the judges of
the law as provided by our statute." Harrzs v. State, 128 Ill. 585, 21
X. E. 563 (1889).
- 31 W Va. 162, 6 S. E. 428 (1888).
'"North Carolina-Const., Art. 1, Sec. 3. 'No person shall be con-
victed of any crime but by the verdict of a jury of good and lawful
men in open court. The Legislature may, however, provide other
means of trial for petty misdemeanorsi with the right of appeal.' Under
this provision the jury may not be waived. State v. Stewart, 89 N. Car.
563 (1883). Tins applies to ordinary misdemeanors as well as felonies.
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tive in nature as to not merely grant a nght to trial by jury but
to forbud that any other tribunal than a jury should pass upon
the issues of fact.
To summarize, it would appear that the refusal to permit
waiver of jury trial in various jurisdictions is based largely
upon the following reasons.
(1) Public policy forbids that a person accused of a crime 9hould
have the right to waive trial by jury since the public as well as the
defendant has an interest in the outcome of the trial.
(2) A criminal court is only organized and empowered to do
business in the presence of a jury of twelve men; in the absence of
such a jury it is without jurisdiction to try the cause.
(3) In some states the constitutional provisions providing for
trial by jury are phrased in such imperative language as to indicate
that trial by jury is compulsory.
It is submitted that there is a satisfactory answer to each
of these objections.
The theory that waiver of jury trial is against public policy
because the state has an interest in the preservation of the lives
and liberties of its citizens and that it would be ughly dangerous
to permit such a practice,-is without substantial basis.35 There
is no practical danger that persons accused of crime will
voluntarily waive a right to jury trial without due deliberation
and a firm conviction that it will not be to their disadvantage.
Nor does the further suggestion that the state is interested
in the punishment of crime and its prevention change this con-
clusion. A judge may be trusted to help preserve the law and
punish offenders as much as the average juryman. He too is
a member of the community and interested in its welfare. Fur-
thermore, his re-election depends upon the proper administra-
tion of his office.
It is the better view that a court has jurisdiction to try a
case without a jury where the defendant has waived his right to
State v. Pulliam, 184 N. C. 681, 114 S. E. 394 (1922). Consent to trial
by fewer than twelve is invalid under this provision. State v. Rogers,
162 N. C. 656, 78 S. E. 293 (1913)." Perkins, 16 Ia. L Rev. 20, 43.
Is "Another ground relied upon for denying the power of a person
accused of a felony to waive a trial by jury is that such a proceeding
is against public policy, because the state, it is said, has an interest
in the preservation of the lives and liberties of its citizens and it would
be highly dangerous to permit such a practice. The theory has no sub-
stantial basis There is no practical danger that accused per-
sons will be so oblivious of the interest which the state has in their
lives and liberties that they will voluntarily go to prison or suffer
death ignominiously." People v. Fisher, 340 Ill. 250, 172 N. E. 722, 723
(1930). Accord, State v. Woodling, 53 Minn. 142, 54 N. W 1068 (1893).
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have one. Nor is legislative aid needed m order to achieve this
result.3 6 The modern trend is toward this conclusion.
In Patton v U S.37 the question whether a jury of twelve
is a constitutional prerequisite to the jurisdiction of the court m
a ernmal case was before the court. The problem Is a partie-
ularly difficult one in the federal courts since the U. S. Code,
Title 28, see. 770 (1928), provides as follows.
"The trial of issues of fact in the district courts in all causes
except cases in equity and cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdic-
tion, and except as otherwise provided in proceeding in bankruptcy,
shall be by jury."
It was held that where there is a valid consent to waive the
jury the court has jurisdiction to try the cause. The reasoning
of the court was as follows :3s
"By the Constitution, Article III, Section 1, the judicial power of
the United States is vested in the Supreme Court and such inferior
courts as Congress may from time to time -rdain and establish. In
pursuance of that authority, Congress, at an early day, established the
district and circuit courts, and by Section 24 of the Judicial Code
(U. S. Code, Title 28, Sec. 41(2), the circuit courts having been
abolished, expressly conferred upon the district courts jurisdiction 'of
all crimes and offenses cognizable under the authority of the United
States' This is a broad and comprehensive grant, and gives the courts
named power to try every criminal case cognizable under the authority
of the United States, subject to the controlling provisions of the Con-
stitution. In the absence of a valid tonsent the district court cannot
proceed except with a jury, not because a jury is necessary to its juris-
diction, but because the accused is entitled by the terms of the Con-
stitution to that mode of trial. Since, however, the right to a jury
trial may be waived, it would be unreasonable to leave the court power-
less to give effect to the waiver and itself dispose of the case. We are
of opinion that the court has authority in the exercise of a sound dis-
cretion to accept the waiver, and, as a necessary corollary to proceed
to the trial and determination of the case with a reduced number or
without a jury; and that jurisdiction to that end is vested by the fore-
going statutory provisions."
's"'The legislature, however, may authorize a waiver of jury trial
by a person accused of crime, and where such authority has been con-
ferred, a defendant who consents to be tried by the court cannot after-
wards complain on the ground that he was not tried by a 3ury.' Mays
v. ommonwealth, 82 Va. -550, 551 (1886). See also WiZson v. State,
16 Ark. 601 (1855), State v. Worden, 46 Conn. 349 (1878), Logan v.
State, 86 Ga. 266, 12 S. E. 406 (1890), Murphy v. State, 97 Ind. 579
(1884), State v. Wells, 69 Kans. 792, 77 Pac. 547 (1904), State v.
Larger, 45 Mo. 510 (1870), State v. Moody, 24 Mo. 560 (1857), DaiZy
v. State, 4 Ohio St. 57 (1854), Dillingham v. State, 5 Ohio St. 280
(1855), State v. Grtggs, 34 W Va. 78, 11 S. E. 740 (1890), In re Staff,
63 Wis. 285, 23 N. W. 587 (1885). See 2 Bishop, New Criminal Pro-
cedure (2 ed.), Sec. 893 (4)." Perkzns, 16 La. L. Rev. 20, 26.
31281 U. S. 276 (1930).
1w Id. at 298. See criticism of the case in 20 Cal. L. Rev. at page
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The Supreme Court of Illinois came to the same conclusion
in the case of People v. Fisher 39 In that case the matter of
jurisdiction was faced squarely by the court. The court held
that when, in a felony case, the defendant waived his right to a
trial by jury, the court had jurisdiction to try the facts. The
argument of the court was as follows :40
"Before he (the defendant) appeared at the bar of the tribunal, it
either was or was not vested with jurisdiction of the subject-matter of
his cause. If the court possessed such jurisdiction, it was conferred by
or pursuant to some provision of the Constitution, and not by the act
or consent of the defendant."
The fact that the constitutional provisions relating to jury
trial are framed in mandatory language does not necessarily
indicate that trial by jury is compulsory It may merely indi-
cate that the framers of the constitution emphatically desired
and provided that the i-ight of jury trial should not be nullified
by the state. To permit the defendant to wasve the right does
not conflict with its preservation for Ins use if he desires to take
advantage of it.
This distinction is pointed out in the case of Com. v Rowe. 41
Article 12 of the constitution of Massachusetts declares
"And the Legislature shall not make any law that shall subject
any person to a capital or infamous punishment, excepting for the
government of the army and navy, without trial by jury."
This language is mandatory in character but the prohibition
is placed, the court considered, upon the state rather than upon
the individual. Nothing in the provision manifests, said the
court, an intention to deprive the individual of power to refuse
to assert his constitutional right to a trial by jury It is sub-
mitted that this interpretation of the rather mandatory language
in various constitutions is the proper one, 42 notwithstanding that
several states hold otherwise. 43
- 340 Ill. 250, 172 N. E. 722 (1930).
S340 Ill. 250, 172 N. E. 722 (1930).
41257 Mass. 172, 153 N. E. 537 (1926).
2 It is believed that this interpretation would be proper even in
the case of North Carolina where the ianguage used is perhaps more
mandatory than in any of the other constitutions. See note 34, supra.
But the courts of that state have held otherwise. See the discussion and
notes, Oppenheim, 25 Mich. L. Rev. 695, 719 et seq.
3. See, for example, the discussion of State v. Cottrill, supra, note33.
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A further question remains to be considered. Some courts
have considered that a plea of guilty is, in legal effect, a waiver
of the right to a trial by the legally constituted tribunal.44 If,
it is argued, a waiver is permitted m this type of situation, it
should be permitted ii the analogous situation where the accused,
while not desiring to plead guilty, does nevertheless desire to
waive a jury trial. In short, it is urged that both situations are
instances of waiver of jury trial. If permitted in the one case,
it should be allowed in the other.
The attempted analogy, while persuasive, is fallacious. The
problems raised in the two situations are by no means the same.
The difference lies in the fact that a plea of guilty raises no ques-
tion of fact to submit to a jury Consequently no jury is
needed. Where the accused, however, pleads not guilty a ques-
tion of fact is raised and it is a real waiver of the right to bd.
tried by a jury when the defendant under such circumstances
voluntarily asks that the court find the facts. 4.5
Summary. The right of every person charged with crime
to a trial by jury existed at common law. It is also guaranteed
by our federal and state constitutions. This paper is a study of
the power of the defendant to waive that right. A few state
constitutions specifically grant an opportunity to waive jury
trial. The majority of them, however, are silent on the question
so that whether there is constitutional power to permit a waiver
is a problem of construction in most states.
11 "But it is said that the right to a trial by a jury is a right which
the defendant may waive. This may be admitted, since every plea of
guilty is, in legal effect, a waiver of the right to a trial by the legally
constituted tribunal." Harris v. State, 128 Ill. 585, 21 N. E. 563, 564
(1889).
"It is certainly true the accused can plead guilty. The state does
not interfere to protect the citizen in such a case. If he may plead
guilty, why may he not elect to be tried by the court, instead of a jury
The innocent and fallible man would be just as likely to plead guilty
as elect to be tried by the court." State v. Carman, 18 N. W 691, 693
(1884).
ISee 21 Harv. L. Rev. 212. Contra, 25 Mich. L. Rev. 695, 716:
"On this question, however, there is a conflict of opinion. A number of
courts have urged that the constitutional guarantee of jury trial has
no application when the accused admits his guilt. They argue that by
such action he dispenses with a trial entirely; there is no question of
fact to be determined; all that remains is a judgment upon the plea,
after the submission of evidence bearing on the degree of guilt and the
amount of punishment. It is a sufficient answer to these contentions
to say that the waiver of the trial altogether-the whole-necessarliy
includes waiver of jury-the part."
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Some jurisdictions concede the constitutionality of waiver;
others deny it. It appears that those which concede it do so
largely upon the theory that it is a privilege intended solely for
the benefit of the accused and one which he may waive at his
election. Those which deny it do so on the ground that public
policy forbids it, that a court has no jurisdiction to try a case
without a jury, or that the state constitutional provision is
phrased in such inperative language as to make it mandatory.
All of these objections, it is submitted, may be satisfactorily
answered.
The modern trend is in the direction of allowing a waiver
of jury trial. The two leading recent decisions, Patton v. U S.
41
and People v. Fisher47 both permit it. Section 266 of the MVlodel
Code of the American Law Institute allows it. These eases and
this Code provision represent, it is submitted, the better rule.
Often a waiver of jury trial presents material advantages to the
accused. 48 It is not without its advantages to the state.4 9
Waiver of other valuable rights is permitted to the accused in
his discretion.50 The historical importance of the jury based
upon the fact that jury trial was regarded as a valuable privi-
lege bestowed upon the person accused of crime for the purpose
of safeguarding him against the oppressive power of the King5
is of no practical value in a republic, particularly where judges
are elected rather than appointed. The jury should remain as
the great fact-finding instrumentality of our legal system. But
if one accused of crime desires to waive this instrumentality he
should have the right to do so, particularly, since it is a privilege
preserved primarily for his protection rather than as a part of
the frame of government.
B. CONSTITUTIONALITY OP WAIVER-IN KENTUCKY
In the foregoing part of this paper the writer has dealt with
the problem of waiver of trial by jury generally Now, particu-
lar attention will be given to the situation in Kentucky
' 281 U. S. 276, 50 Sup. Ct. 153 (1930), discussed supra.
340 Ill. 250, 172 N. E. 722 (1930), discussed supra.
18 16 Ia. L. Rev. 223.
9 16 Ia. L. Rev. 225 et seq.
50In re Staff, 23 N. W 587, 590 (1885), Hack v. State, 141 Wis. 346,
124 N. W. 492, 494 (1910).
'Blackstone, Bk. IV, p. 349.
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The Constitution of Kentucky contains three provisions
relating to trial by jury Section 7 guarantees
"The ancient mode of trial of jury shall be held sacred, and the
right thereof remain inviolate subject to such modifications as may
be authorized by this Constitution."5
Section 2 of the Constitution provides:
"In all criminal prosecutions the accused has the right to be heard
by himself and counsel; to demand the nature and cause of the accusa-
tion against him; to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have com-
pulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor. He cannot be
compelled to give evidence against himself, nor can he be deprived
of life, liberty, or property, unless by the judgment of his peers or the
law of the land; and in prosecutions by indictment or information,
he shall have a speedy public tral by an z7partial jury of the vicnage,
but the general assembly may provide by a general law for a change
of venue in such prosecutions for both the defendant and the Com-
monwealth, the change to be made to the most convenient county in
which a fair trial can be obtained."13 (Italics are ours.)
Section 248 of the Constitution provides:
"A grand jury shall consist of twelve persons, nine of whom con-
curring may find an indictment. In civil and misdemeanor cases, in
courts inferior to the circuit courts, a jury shall consist of six persons.
The general assembly may provide that in any or all trials of civil
actions in the circuit courts, three-fourths or more of the jurors con-
curring may return a verdict, which shall have the same force and
effect as if rendered by the entire panel. But where a verdict is
rendered by a less number than the whole jury, it shall be signed by all
the jurors who agree to it."
In contrast to these more or less -general provisions in the
Constitution, Kentucky Statutes, Section 2252 provides.
"A petit jury mn the circuit courts shall consist of twelve persons,
and in all trials held in courts inferior, to the circuit court, or by any
county, police, or city judge, or justice of the peace, a, jury shall con-
sist of six persons; but the parties to any action or prosecution, except
for felony, may agree to a trial by a less number of persons than is
provided for in this section." (Italics are ours.)
And Car. Codes, 1927, Crim. Prac., See. 180, contains this
provision.
"Issues of law shall be tried by the court. Issues of fact, in prose-
cution for offenses of which the punishment is limited to a fine of
sixteen dollars, shall be tried by the court. All other issues of fact
shall be tried by a jury."
52 The present Constitution was adopted in 1891. This section was
copied verbatim from the Constitution of 1850, Art. XIII, Sec. 8. In
the second Constitution of Kentucky, adopted in 1799, Art. X, Sec. 6
reads, "That the ancient mode of trial by jury shall be held sacred, and
the right thereof remain inviolate." In the first Constitution, Art XII,
Sec. 6 provided, "That trial by jury shall be as heretofore, and the
right thereof remain inviolate."
See Gregory's Ky. Crim. Law, Sec. 1023.
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The ease law on waiver of trial by jury in Kentucky may be
found in the following decisions: Murphy v. Commonwealth,5 4
Tyra v Commonwealth,5 5 Phipps v. Commonwealth,5 6 Branham
v. Comnwnwealth,57 Jackson v Commonwealth,58 and MoPerkins
V. State.59
In Murphy v Commonvealth,60 the defendant was indicted
for betting on an election, a nsdemeanor involving a statutory
penalty of one hundred dollars. After the jury was sworn, one
of the jurors, by agreement of the parties, was withdrawn, and
the case-submitted to the remaining eleven jurors. The judg-
ment rendered upon their verdict was held valid. The court
considered that nothing more was involved in the issue of the
case than is involved in the decision of civil actions since the
only penalty provided under the statute was a money fine.
Furthermore, the court stated, such an agreement was not mcon-
sistent with any rule of law nor public policy While the
analogy to civil actions may be criticised, the result in the case
is the proper one.
In Tyra v. Commonuealth61 the defendant was indicted for
malicious stabbing with intent to kill. Under such an indict-
ment the defendant as provided by the Code could be found
guilty, either of the felony as charged or of any lower degree of
that offense. After the jury was sworn and had heard a portion
of the testimony, one juror was waived by consent of all parties
and the cause tried to the remaining eleven. They found the
defendant guilty of one of the lower degrees of the felony
charged, which was a misdemeanor. The court held the judg-
ment binding, relying solely upon Murphy v Commonwealth,
supra.62 The case adds nothing to the rule of that case that a
jury of twelve may be waived in a trial involving a nsdemeanor.
The rule was affirmed in the subsequent case of Phipps v. Co~M-
monwealth.63 In that case a jury of ten heard the evidence
511 Mete. (Ky.) 365 (1858).
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u236 Ky. 528, 33 S. W (2d) 622 (1930).
11 Mete. (Ky.) 365 (1858).
e2 Mete. (Ky.) 1 (1859).
1 Mete. (Ky.) 365 (1858).
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without objection by the defendant and it was held on appeal
that it would be assumed that he waived his constitutional right
to a jury of twelve. Under this decision it would appear that
the defendant must affirmatively object to a jury of less than
twelve. It is submitted that the better rule is that a defendant
can only waive his constitutional right to jury trial by affirma-
tive waiver made of record in open court.
Branham v Comnwnwealth 4 was the first case to present a
situation mvolvng a felony Branham was indicted, tried by
agreement before a jury of seven and convicted. The Court of
Appeals reversed the judgment and remanded the cause for a
new trial The court considered the decision of the question at
issue, the power of a defendant charged with the commission of
a felony to waive trial by jury, to be controlled by Section 7 of
the Constitution and Section 2252, Kentucky Statutes. The
Constitution, Section 7, preserves and guarantees to one charged
with crime the ancient mode of trial by jury Kentucliy Stat-
utes, Section 2252 permts the waiver of this rijht in all but
felony cases. Consequently, Branham, who was charged with
the commission of a felony, could not waive his constitutional
right to a trial by jury
The decision was affirmed two years later in the case of
'Jackson v. (ommonwealt.. 0" Jackson was indicted charged with
the commission of a felony He was tried and convicted by a
jury consisting of eleven persons only On appeal he contended
that such a jury was not a constitutional jury for the trial of
felony charges. The commonwealth insisted that he could not
rely upon the fact that he was-tried by less than the constitu-
tional jury since he did not object at the time the jury was made
up, nor rely on that fact in his motion for a new trial. The case
does not present a situation of true waiver but the court in reach-
ing a decision did so by affirming its position laid down in-the
Branham case that a defendant charged with a felony cannot
waive his right to jury trial and then holding that "it neces-
sarily follows that he may not do so indirectly by failing to
object to a jury composed of a less or a greater number." In
reacing this result the court relied upon the "mandatory mean-
209 Ky. 734, 273 S. W. 489 (1925).
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mg and effect of the inhibition of Section 2252, Kentucky Stat-
utes."
The latest case to date on the subject of waiver of trial by
jury m Kentucky is McPerkans v Commonwealth,60  winch
simply says, citing Jackson v. Commonwealth67 and Branham v.
Commonweath6s without discussion, "Trial by jury in felony
cases, is a constitutional right that cannot be waived."
There seems to be little doubt as to the state of the law in
regard to waiver of jury trial in Kentucky today In a trial
involving a misdemeanor the parties may waive a jury Tins
was so even before the enactment of Kentucky Statutes, Section
2252, winch provides for waiver in crimes below the grade of
felomes. 69 The reasoning in the early misdemeanor cases is not
satisfactory but the result reached is desirable. In prosecutions
for offenses of winch the punishment is limited to a fine of six-
teen dollars, Car. Codes, 1927, Crnn. Prac., See. 180, providing
for trial by the court, is controlling.
Trial by jury cannot be waaved in felony cases. Section
2252, Kentucky Statutes seems to be absolutely controlling.
From the wording of the statute no other result seems possible.
The interesting question presented is whether if Section 2252
were repealed or amended to modify the exception, waiver of
jury trial in felony cases would be prohibited under Section 7 of
the Constitution. It is our opinion that it would not. Ap-
parently the court held in Branham v. CommonweaZk."0 that
Section 7 preserves the "ancient mode of trial by jury " A.
waiver of this guaranteed right under the Constitution, the
court considered, was impossible under the mandatory language
used in Section 2252, Kentucky Statutes. The court did not
have to, nor did it attempt to consider the effect of a waiver in
the absence of statute. In the case of MoPerkins v Common-
wealth,7" the court said, "Trial by jury in felony cases is a con-
stitutional right that cannot be waived" That is true but it is
true because Section 2252, Kentucky Statutes, prohibits it. As
authority for the statement the court cited Jackson v. Common.
- 236 Ky. 528, 33 S. W (2d) 622 (1930).
Y221 Ky. 823, 299 S. W 983 (1922).
- 209 Ky. 734, 273 S. W. 489 (1925).
0 See notes 60 and 61, supra.
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wealth 72 and Branham v Com omowealth. 73 In each of these
cases the court considered the decision to be controlled by Sec-
tion 2252, Kentucky Statutes.
74
Since the Court of Appeals of Kentucky is not bound by
prior decision as to waiver of trial by jury in felony cases in
the absence of statute, it could approach the question as one of
original impression, if Section 2252 were repealed or amended
to modify the exception. If given this opportunity, it is sub-
mitted, the court should not consider a waiver unconstitutional.
Although there is conflict in the decisions as to whether waiver
is unconstitutional in the absence of statute, the modern trend
is toward this conclusion, as indicated supra in this paper. The
historical basis for a contra conclusion is no longer of value; the
defendant should be permitted to waive the personal privilege of
jury trial if he so desires. The Kentucky Court of Appeals has
reached this conclusion in the absence of statute as to nnsde-
meanors, it should do the same with reference to felonies. The
general principles underlying the power to waive is the same m
both instances.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR KENTUCKY
The following specific recommendations are made
"1. Repeal Section 2252, Kentucky Statutes.
2. Enact the following new provision:
"In all cases except where a sentence of death may be imposed
trial by a jury may be waived by the defendant. Such waiver shall
be made in open court and entered of record."
3. Amend the code provision on arraignment to provide that the
defendant who pleads not guilty shall be reminded of his right to be
tried either by a jury or by the court alone and shall be asked, which
mode of trial he prefers.
The second recommendation is-an exact copy of Section 266
of the Model Code of the American Law Institute. The recom-
mendations as a whole embody the major conclusions in the body
of this paper and represent the trend of modern opinion on
waiver of trial by jury
It is possible that a satisfactory result could be reached by
amending Section 2252, Kentucky Statutes so as to modify the
?2221 Ky. 823, 299 S. W 983 (1922).
7'209 Ky. 734, 273 S. W 489 (1925).




exception as to felonies by limiting it to those where a sentence
of death may be imposed. It is considered though that it is
better to repeal the statute and substitute the exact provision
suggested in the Model Code. This provision was adopted after
a careful consideration of the whole problem. In construing it,
the Court of Appeals would have the benefit of decisions in other
states, since the section, as written, will be adopted in various
jurisdictions.
There is considerable opposition to allowing waiver of jury
trial in capital cases,-the proposed statute excepts them. If
jury trial is a privilege whnch the accused may forego, it is not
consistent to reqire the consent of the state or of the court, as
a condition precedent to the exercise of the right. However, it
is wise that the exercise of the right to waave be made in open
court and formally entered of record in order that the court may
see to it that the waiver is willingly and understandingly made.
It is quite commonly understood that the accused in a crimm-
nal case has the right to a trial by jury The right to waive
jury trial is not so commonly understood. Consequently, at the
time of arraignment in all but capital cases, if the defendant
pleads not guilty, he should have pointed out to him that he has
an election as to the mode of trial.75 He should be asked at that
tine in open court whether he elects to be tried by a jury or by
the court alone. Tins may be accomplished by amending the
code provisions on arragnment726 It is our opinion that such





"For a discussion of this suggestion see 16 Ia. L. Rev. 20, 230.
0 Code provisions dealing with arraignment will be found in Car.
Codes, 1927, Crim. Prac., Sees. 154 and 155.
11 The following articles will be found helpful in a study of Waiver
of Jury Trial in Criminal Cases:
Oppenheim, Waiver of Trial by Jury in Criminal Cases, 25 Mich.
L. Rev. 695 (1927), Proposed Jury Changes in Criminal Cases, 16 Ia.
L. Rev. 20 (1930), Grant, Waiver of Jury Trial in Felony Cases, 20
Cal. L. Rev. 132 (1932), Abolition of Grand Jury and Waiver of Jury
Trial, 65 U. S. L. Rev. 528 (1931), Right to Waive Trial by Jury in
Criminal Cases, 48 A. L. R. 767 (1927), Ervin, Trial Without Jury in
Criminal Cases, 15 Jour. Amer. Jud. Soc. 71 (1931), Hennessy, Waiver
of Jury Trial by the Accused in Felony Cases, 4 Dak. L. Rev. 85
(1932), Editorial, Waiver of Trial by Jury, 16 Amer. Bar Assn. Jour.
372.
